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In this paper we study a variant of the two-stage location-then-price
game where consumers are distributed piecewise uniformly, each piece
being referred to as an interval. Clearly, only the exact interval in which
the indierent consumer is located may be uncertain for the rms.
Therefore, we encompass the rms with beliefs about the interval in
which the indierent consumer is located. Given their beliefs, the
rms' expected demands are dierentiable everywhere and the rms'
expected prot functions are quasi-concave. We dene the game where
rms rst choose beliefs and then maximize the corresponding expected
prot in two stages to be a psychological game. We show that there
exists a unique psychological equilibrium for this game, which consists
of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the two-stage game given
certain beliefs and the beliefs are such that the equilibrium outcome
is consistent with these beliefs. We give a coordination argument in
order to easily nd this equilibrium.
This research is part of the VF program "Competition and Cooperation". The author
would like to thank Chris van Raalte and Dolf Talman for their valuable comments on
previous drafts of this paper.
yDepartment of Econometrics and CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we present a generalization of the standard Hotelling (1929)
model of spatial competition where rms rst choose locations and then,
given these locations, compete in prices. In the model consumers are dis-
tributed according to a piecewise uniform density along a line segment,
whereas in the standard model consumers are distributed with uniform den-
sity. The dierent pieces are referred to as intervals. This specication of the
consumers' density could make our results widely applicable, because any
density function can be approximated with a piecewise uniform density, by
passing to ner partitions. As a consequence the rms' prot functions are
piecewise quasi-concave and they are not dierentiable everywhere due to
the fact that demand is kinked. For any given locations and prices, however,
both rms know that there is a unique indierent consumer. This means
that only the exact interval in which the indierent consumer is located,
may be uncertain for both rms. Therefore we encompass the rms with
beliefs about the interval in which the indierent consumer is located, called
the state. Recently Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989) and Kolpin
(1992) introduced the psychological game to provide a framework for the
formal analysis of strategic settings in which expectations play a role1. The
principal characteristic of a psychological game is that the rms' expected
prots depend on what everybody believes. Given their beliefs, the rms' ex-
pected demands are dierentiable everywhere and the rms' expected prot
functions are quasi-concave. We dene the game where rms rst choose
beliefs and then maximize the corresponding expected prot in two stages
to be a psychological game.
We show that there exists a unique psychological equilibrium for this
game. Such an equilibrium consists of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
for the two-stage game given certain beliefs and the beliefs are such that
the equilibrium outcome is consistent with these beliefs, i.e., the state cor-
responds to the location of the indierent consumer. In equilibrium, the
indierent consumer is exactly the median consumer while both rms have
identical prots. Furthermore we present a natural way to nd the psy-
chological equilibrium, which implicitly requires rms to coordinate on the
interval that contains the indierent consumer.
This paper is related to the work of Goeree and Ramer (1994), who
generalize the results for the traditional two-stage location-then-price game,
1In another context these, subjective, expectations are often referred to as emotions.
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by allowing for log-concave densities, and to the work of Tabuchi and Thisse
(1995), who look at the specic example of a triangular density in more
detail. They nd that in general equilibrium prots dier over the two
rms. In case of a triangular density we show, however, that the rm with
the lower prot has a prot that is lower than the psychological equilibrium
prot, which casts doubt on the credibility of the asymmetric outcome.
As Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989) argue, the usual solution
concepts are valid only as long as the correct payo function is employed.
There are several reasons to favour the psychological game approach.
First, the psychological equilibrium outcome is robust in the sense that the
indierent consumer is exactly the median consumer. The rms' locations
and prices are determined completely by the density function then. Second,
equilibrium outcomes are such that both rms have the same prot, so,
even without restricting one rm to locate to the left of the other rm,
neither rm has an incentive to deviate. In that sense the coordination
problem arising in Goeree and Ramer (1994) does not appear. Third, the
psychological game approach is also applicable in case of density functions
that are not log-concave.
This paper is based on Webers (1994) and is organized as follows. In
Section 2 the model is presented and the denition of psychological game
is given. In Section 3 the psychological equilibrium for this game is intro-
duced and the equilibrium conditions are derived. In Section 4 we prove the
existence of a, generically, unique psychological equilibrium with consistent
beliefs. In Section 5 we use a coordination argument to nd this equilib-
rium. In Section 6 we discuss the case of a triangular density and in Section
7 we briey look at the two-dimensional case. The proofs are gathered in
the Appendix.
2 The model
There is a continuum of consumers distributed along the line segment [0; 1]
with cumulative density function F1 : [0; 1] 7! [0; 1]. There are two rms,
indexed i 2 I = f1; 2g. Firm i 2 I locates at xi along the real line and sells
the commodity at price pi 2 IR+. Real income of the consumers is given by
w. Each consumer buys one unit of the commodity from the rm that oers
the highest indirect utility, for rm i 2 I being given by
Vi(x; xi; pi) = w   pi   t(x; xi); (1)
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where x is the consumer's location in the unit interval. The number t(x; xi) is
the transportation cost for shipping the product of rm i to this consumer's
location. We assume this transportation cost to be quadratic in distance
with unit cost equal to one, i.e., t(x; xi) = (x xi)
2. The market area of the
product of rm i 2 I at given locations x1 and x2 and prices p1 and p2 is
therefore given by
Mi(x1; x2; p1; p2) = fx 2 [0; 1] j Vi(x; xi; pi)  Vj(x; xj; pj); j 6= ig;
i.e., the set of consumers that prefer the commodity of rm i over the com-
modity of rm j, j 6= i 2 I . The demandXi(x1; x2; p1; p2) for the commodity
of rm i 2 I then is equal to




By denition, the sum of the commodity demands equals one. Given x1,
x2, p1 and p2 the location of the consumer indierent between buying from
rm 1 and buying from rm 2 is given by







being the midpoint between the rms' locations corrected for price dier-
ences. Under the assumption that the price dierences are not too large,
both rms will sell their products. From equations (2) and (3) it follows
that for i 2 I
Xi(x1; x2; p1; p2) = Fi(x(x1; x2; p1; p2)); (4)
where for all x 2 [0; 1], F2(x) = 1   F1(x). Given the locations x1 and x2
and prices p1 and p2 the prot of rm i 2 I is equal to piFi(x(x1; x2; p1; p2)),
where costs are assumed to be normalized to zero.
The function F1 is assumed to be continuous, but is allowed to be non-
dierentiable in a nite number of, say n   1, points t1; : : : ; tn 1, with 0 =
t0 < t1 < : : : < tn 1 < tn = 1. For k 2 K = f0; : : : ; n  1g, we assume there
is a dierentiable function Fik : [0; 1] 7! IR+ such that Fi coincides with Fik
for tk  x  tk+1, i 2 I . We assume that each rm has beliefs about the
state, being the interval in which the indierent consumer is located. The
beliefs bik rm i 2 I has about the location of the indierent consumer to
lie in the interval [tk ; tk+1], k 2 K, is represented by the vector of beliefs




k=0 yk = 1g. At beliefs
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bi 2 Bi and with the indierent consumer located at x 2 [0; 1], the expected





Clearly, for given bi 2 Bi, the expected demand function Fi(bi; :), i 2 I , is
dierentiable. For simplicity, given bi 2 Bi the function Fi is assumed to be
three times continuously dierentiable. Note that in case F1 is (three times)
continuously dierentiable and hence n = 1, expected demand is equal to
demand.
For given beliefs bi 2 Bi, the expected prot for rm i 2 I is equal to
i(bi; x1; x2; p1; p2) = piFi(bi; x(x1; x2; p1; p2)): (6)
Now we are able to introduce the psychological game.
Denition 2.1 The game where rms rst choose beliefs and then max-
imize the corresponding expected prot in a two-stage location-then-price
game is a (strategic form) psychological game G.
At given beliefs b = (b1; b2) 2 B = B1  B2, the two-stage game with
payos 1(b1; :) and 2(b2; :) is a conventional two-stage location-then-price
game, which we refer to as G(b).
3 The equilibrium concept
First we dene the solution concept for the two-stage location-then-price
game G with beliefs. At given beliefs b 2 B and at given locations x1 < x2,
suppose pi (b; x1; x2) is the unique corresponding Nash equilibrium price for
rm i 2 I . Given these prices the rms choose locations as to maximize
their expected prots. Because equilibrium prices depend on the other rm's
beliefs, also the rm's location choices for the game G(b) will depend on the
other rm's beliefs. Suppose the corresponding Nash equilibrium locations
are unique also, to be denoted by x1(b) for rm 1 and x

2(b) for rm 2. The
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy at beliefs b 2 B for the game




1(b; x1; x2); p

2(b; x1; x2)) j x1 <





























We say that beliefs b 2 B are consistent if for all i 2 I and for all k 2 K
bik = 1 if tk < x
(b) < tk+1
bik = 0 if x
(b) < tk or x
(b) > tk+1
bik 2 [0; 1] otherwise;
(8)
so, expected demand is equal to realized demand.
Denition 3.1 A psychological equilibrium for a psychological game G with
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibria at any beliefs is a pair of strategies
s
 and beliefs b 2 B such that b is consistent and s is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium strategy for the game G(b), i.e., s = s(b).
First we determine the solution to the location-then-price game for xed
beliefs b 2 B. For i 2 I , let fi denote the rst order derivative of Fi with
respect to x, let f 0i denote the second order derivative of Fi with respect to
x and let f 00i denote the third order derivative of Fi with respect to x. For
simplicity we let fi(bi; x) > 0 for all bi 2 Bi and x 2 [0; 1]. For rm i 2 I ,





















where x is given by equation (3). In general, the set of equations (9) and
(10) has multiple solutions, or no solutions at all. For the case where F1 is
three times continuosly dierentiable and consequently F1 = F1, i.e., beliefs
do not matter, Goeree and Ramer (1994) prove the existence of a unique
price equilibrium assuming log-concavity of F1. They apply a theorem of
Caplin and Nalebu (1991) in order to show the quasi-concavity of the
prot functions. For the case where F1 is continuous but not dierentiable
everywhere, in the next section, for any beliefs b 2 B, we prove the existence
of a unique price equilibrium for the situation of piecewise linearity of F1.
In this case prot is piecewise quasi-concave. With a piecewise linear F1 we
are able to approximate any cumulative density function by passing to ner
partitions, i.e., by increasing n.
However, for the time being we need only the existence of a unique so-
lution pi (b; x1; x2) for i 2 I to the price stage at any beliefs b 2 B. For ease
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of notation we write x(b; x1; x2) = x(x1; x2; p

1(b; x1; x2); p

2(b; x1; x2)). The
prot of rm i 2 I at the equilibrium prices is denoted by i (b; x1; x2) =
i(b; x1; x2; p

1(b; x1; x2); p

2(b; x1; x2)). Given these prices, rm i 2 I strate-
gically chooses at b 2 B location xi as to maximize its prot 

i (b; x1; x2).











































































Consequently, assuming that x1(b) and x

2(b) are the unique solutions to




1(b; x1; x2); p

2(b; x1; x2)) j x1 < x2g > is the
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy for the game G(b).
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4 Existence of psychological equilibria
We consider a piecewise uniform density function having a piecewise linear










This means that tk =
k
n
for k 2 K. The density will be denoted by the tuple
< d1; : : : ; dn >. Note that we have the standard uniform case when n = 1
or dk+1 = 1 for each k 2 K. We denote Dk =
Pk
m=0 dm for all k 2 K, where
we dene d0 = 0. For given beliefs bi 2 Bi, the expected demand for rm
i 2 I is linear in x and can be written as










k=1 b2k(Dk   kdk+1);
1(b1) =
Pn 1
k=0 b1kdk+1; 2(b2) =  
Pn 1
k=0 b2kdk+1:
Clearly, fi(bi; x) = i(bi) and f
0
i(bi; x) = f
00
i (bi; x) = 0 for all i 2 I and
bi 2 Bi. Equation (9) can be rewritten then as









and the second order conditions for a maximumare fullled because 1(b1) >
0 and 2(b2) < 0. Note that 2(b2) = 1 1(b1) and 2(b2) =  1(b1) in case
rms have identical beliefs, i.e., b1 = b2.
Proposition 4.1 For any density < d1; : : : ; dn > with n 2 IN, any b 2 B
and any x1 < x2, there exists a unique solution to the price stage for the
game G(b) given by
p












for i 6= j 2 I.
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Proof
Substitution of the prices from equation (15) into equation (3) yields
x










The corresponding prices are given then by
p












for i 6= j 2 I
2























Given the prices pi (b; x1; x2), i 2 I , the rms choose locations as to
maximize their expected prots. The prot of rm i 6= j 2 I can be written
then as












Proposition 4.2 For any density < d1; : : : ; dn > with n 2 IN and any
beliefs b 2 B, there exists a unique solution to the location stage for the













for i 6= j 2 I.
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Proof See Appendix.
It is easily checked that equation (16) is satised at the solution x1(b)













From this we derive the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3 For any density < d1; : : : ; dn > with n 2 IN, generically,
there exists a unique psychological equilibrium (s; b) with s = s(b). In



















for some k 2 K, i.e., the median
consumer is exactly located at a corner, and both k   1 and k induce a
psychological equilibrium. Prots for both rms, however, are maximized for
the value of k 2 fk 1; kg for which the corresponding value dk is minimal,
because then equilibrium prices are higher while demand is 1
2
in both cases.
When dk 1 = dk , prots are the same for both values of k. Consequently,
for all i 2 I and for all symmetric beliefs b 2 B with bi(k 1) = 1   bik
and bik 2 [0; 1], prots are maximized then and the indierent consumer is
exactly the median consumer.

















that b1k = b

2k = 1. Equilibrium beliefs b

2 B are such that both rms
have the same (expected) demands. We denote x = x(b). In equilibrium






which is exactly the median consumer because F1(x




case of symmetric densities equation (20) reduces to x = 1
2
. For n odd, we
have k = n 1
2










even, k is either n
2
  1 or n
2




Corollary 4.4 For any density < d1; : : : ; dn > with n 2 IN, generically,
the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for the game G(b) is



















For the equilibrium beliefs b 2 B specied in Theorem 4.3 it is easy to
calculate that xi = x

i (b








)) for i 2 I from








Thus the two rms always charge the same price in equilibrium and
furthermore both rms have dierent locations in equilibrium. This means
that the principle of minimum dierentiation no longer holds. Note that
these results are similar to the results Lederer and Hurter (1986) nd for the
situation of discriminatory pricing. In case of a symmetric density the result













Intuitively this 'symmetric' result is what we could expect. It is exactly the
result Goeree and Ramer (1994) nd for symmetric densities in case F1 is
dierentiable. Because the prices and demands are the same for both rms,







Finally we look at the degree of dierentiation in equilibrium.
Lemma 4.5 For any density < d1; : : : ; dn > with n 2 IN, generically, the







In equilibrium x1 and x

2 are according to Corollary 4.4. But then we can



















In particular if the consumers are distributed uniformly then the degree
of dierentiation is equal to 3
2






















Consequently, for the limiting case dk+1 = n, i.e., demand is concentrated
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entirely in an innitesimal interval, the degree of dierentiation tends to
zero if n goes to innity. Only for this case, Hotelling's principle of min-
imum dierentiation is restored. In general we nd that, when demand is
more concentrated at the centre both rms will locate closer to the centre,
and, when demand is concentrated at the endpoints, both rms will locate
further away from the centre.
5 A coordination argument
As argued before, both rms know that for any tuple of locations and prices,
generically, there is a unique interval in which the indierent consumer is
located. The only uncertainty the rms face is that a priori they do not know
what interval will result. Let the beliefs of rm i 2 I about the location





], k 2 K,
be represented by the vector bi = (bi0; : : : ; bi(n 1)) in the set B
c
i = fy 2
f0; 1gn j
Pn 1
k=0 yk = 1g. This means that the vector bi 2 B
c
i , i 2 I , is a unit
vector. We will write bi(k) 2 B
c
i for the kth unit vector, k 2 K. Because of
consistency, it is natural to assume that the rms coordinate on the same





2g. The corresponding conventional two-stage location-then-price
game with beliefs b(k) 2 Bc is referred to as G(b(k)). Because, generically,
equilibrium beliefs b are in Bc, the unique equilibrium stated in Theorem
4.3 will be found again, generically, but the approach in this section to nd
this equilibrium is based on coordination. At beliefs b(k) 2 Bc, expected
demand for rm i 2 I is linear in x and can be written as
F
k



















Applying Proposition 4.1 then yields the solution
p





x1 + x2 +




to the price stage for the game G(b(k)) by substituting ki and 
k
i for i(bi)
and i(bi), respectively, for all i 2 I . The solution to the location stage is
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2 . At these















equation (24) then yields the following result.
Lemma 5.1 For any density < d1; : : : ; dn > with n 2 IN, the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for the game G(b(k)) is consistent if k 2 K
satises the condition
0  n  2Dk  2dk+1:
As we know already from Theorem 4.3, generically, there exists a unique
psychological equilibrium.
Proposition 5.2 For any density < d1; : : : ; dn > with n 2 IN, there is at
least one value k 2 K for which b(k) induces a psychological equilibrium. If
k

2 K is not unique, either b(k 1) or b(k+1) also induces a psychological
equilibrium.
Proof See Appendix.













for some k 2 K then we end up at the corner solution k
n
where the
equilibria are paired, i.e., the indierent consumer is the same. Otherwise
we end up at an interior solution, as we saw already in Theorem 4.3.
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Corollary 5.3 For any density < d1; : : : ; dn > with n 2 IN, generically,
the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for the game G(b(k))




















This follows easily from Corollary 4.4.










where the last inequality results from the fact that 5n  4Dk+1 is positive.
This means that the indierent consumer is located to the right of rm 1







]. This formalizes Smithies' (1941) notions of 'competitive
region' for the region [xc1 ; x
c
2 ] and of 'hinterlands' for the regions ( 1; x
c
1 )
and (xc2 ;1). It is obvious by now that the size of the competitive region
crucially depends on the density. Nevertheless the density is irrelevant for
the size of the market areas.
6 The triangular density
In this section we apply the psychological game approach to an example
introduced by Tabuchi and Thisse (1995). Consider the cumulative density
function F1 : [0; 1] 7! [0; 1] given by
F1(x) =
(






 x  1;
where F1k : [0; 1] 7! IR, k 2 f0; 1g, are given by F10(x) = 2x
2 and F11(x) =
4x 2x2 1. Note that at x = 12 , F1 is continuously dierentiable only once.
In case of identical beliefs b̂ = (bs; bs) 2 B, expected demand for rm i 2 I
is quadratic in x and can be written as




̂1(bs) = 1  ̂2(bs) =  bs1;
̂1(bs) =  ̂2(bs) = 4bs1;
̂1(bs) =  ̂2(bs) = 2(bs0   bs1) = 2  4bs1:
14
Because F1 is logconcave there exists a unique solution to the price stage
for all b̂ 2 B, given implicitly by equation (9). The solution to the location
stage can be found from equation (11).
Lemma 6.1 For beliefs bs = (1; 0), the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
















the indierent consumer is located at (6) 
1
2 . For beliefs bs = (0; 1), the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for the game G(b̂) is given by














> and the indierent consumer is located
at 1   (6) 
1




2), the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium











> and the indierent








< 1   (6) 
1
2 , it is easy to see that all these three
equilibrium outcomes are consistent. In fact these are the only three consis-
tent equilibrium outcomes. The rst two, asymmetric, solutions are the ones
found by Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) and Goeree and Ramer (1994), which
in fact require rms to be treated asymmetrically. The third, symmetric,
solution is the one which follows by approximating the cumulative density
function with a piecewise linear cumulative density.
Consider therefore the following piecewise uniform density with n+1
2
2 IN,





], k 2 K, consumers are located with





for k 2 f0; : : : ; n 1
2
g
dn k for k 2 f
n 1
2
+ 1; : : : ; n  1g:
(26)
Then we get the following result.
Lemma 6.2 For the density < d1; : : : ; dn > with
n+1
2
2 IN specied in















>. For n ! 1 we















For n 2 IN odd it is clear from Theorem 4.3 that k = n 1
2 . But then we














. Corollary 4.4 then gives the required result.
The limiting result is found immediately.
It is clear by now that approximating a cumulative density function
with a piecewise linear cumulative density lets the asymmetric equilibria
disappear. In equilibrium the indierent consumer is exactly the median
consumer. Consequently, rms' demands, prices and prots are the same.
7 The two-dimensional case
In this section we point out briey the applicability of our results to the two-
dimensional case, i.e., the case where consumers are located on the square
S = [0; 1] [0; 1]. For ease of exposition we let consumers be distributed
uniformly over S. Firm i 2 I is located at xi 2 S and sells the commodity at
price pi. For convenience we let x1 6= x2. Because transportation costs are
assumed to be quadratic in distance, the set of indierent consumers is a line
segment perpendicular to the line passing through the rms' locations. For
any xed location pair, the demand for the commodity of rm i 2 I can be
approximated by a one-dimensional density < d1; : : : ; dn > with n 2 IN, and
consequently Theorem 4.3 can be applied. Note, however, that the density
depends on the line on which they are located. Essentially this means that
rms also have to decide upon the line along which to locate. In Figure 1
the bold line depicts the possible equilibrium locations in case rms locate





). The two dashed
lines depict the degree of dierentiation at the corresponding equilibrium
conguration.
We see that the degree of dierentiation lies between its minimum 34(2)
1
2























2). The rst result is exactly the result stated in
Lemma 6.2, but then on the interval [0; (2)
1
2 ] instead of [0; 1]. The second
result is exactly the result for the uniform case as can be seen from Lemma
4.5. In case the degree of dierentiation equals 34(2)
1
2 per rm prot is 38
and in case the degree of dierentiation equals 3
2
per rm prot is 3
4
. So

































































Figure 1: Possible equilibrium locations.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Recall that for each density < d1; : : : ; dn > with n 2 IN and beliefs b 2 B,





































The second order conditions for a maximum are fullled (at least in case












i 6= j 2 I .
Proof of Theorem 4.3
From Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 we know that (up to symmetry) for any







1(b; x1; x2); p

2(b; x1; x2)) j x1 < x2g > for the game G(b).
Given beliefs b 2 B, there generically exists a unique corresponding state,








to (8), consistency requires that, for all i 2 I , bik = 1 and b

ik = 0 for
k 6= k 2 K. This means that equilibrium beliefs are identical. From






















Finally we have to show that there is a unique value k 2 K that satises
equation (29). Suppose without loss of generality that equation (29) is also





















Proof of Proposition 5.2
The rst part we prove by contradiction using an induction argument. Let
Kk be dened as f0; : : : ; kg for any k 2 K. Suppose that there is no equi-






does not hold for k = 0. Since D0 = 0 the condition can be





. Clearly 0  1
2d1
always holds, therefore it must
be that d1 <
n
2
. Next suppose that there is no equilibrium for k 2 K1. If






not hold. Because there is no equilibrium for k = 0 we furthermore know
that d1 <
n
2 . But then the condition simplies to D2 <
n
2 . By induction




which contradicts Dn = 1. Therefore there exists an equilibrium for some
k










. Now suppose without loss of
generality that there also exists an equilibrium for some k > k where k 2 K.


























must be equal to 1
2
and k be equal to k + 1. It
is easy to see that there are at most two equilibria. Suppose to the con-






















Proof of Lemma 6.1
For beliefs bs = (1; 0) we have ̂1 = 1   ̂2, ̂1 = ̂2 = 0, and ̂1 =  ̂2 = 2.
Consequently, F1(bs; x) = 2x
2 and F2(bs; x) = 1  2x
2. From the rst order














2 . The corresponding prices are 718 and
14
18 , respectively. The proof





2) we have ̂1 = 1   ̂2 =  
1
2 , ̂1 =  ̂2 = 2, and ̂1 =  ̂2 = 0.
Consequently, F1(bs; x) = 2x 
1
2
and F2(bs; x) =
3
2
 2x. From equation (11)
we then nd the solution x(b̂) = 1
2
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